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REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION vs. SENIORITY IN THE 
APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Statement of the Issue 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals created a split among circuits in 
determining that seniority policies are but one factor in the undue hardship 
analysis of a proposed reasonable accommodation in Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.1  
One of the dissenters had this to say about the majority’s opinion: 
  The sweeping language and exalted tone of the court’s wide-ranging 
opinion make clear that it aspires to offer a definitive interpretation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  This might be less disturbing if this 
case actually involved an American with a disability.  Because the court 
reaches out to decide several important issues of first impression in a case 
without a proper plaintiff, I must respectfully dissent. . . .2 
. . . . 
  A case so transparently lacking in merit is an inappropriate vehicle for 
deciding multiple questions of first impression concerning the proper 
construction of an important statute (and creating a circuit split in the 
process). . . . The court has issued what in effect amounts to a lengthy advisory 
opinion on the ADA . . . .3 
Despite the sharp criticism of Justice O’Scannlain’s dissent, the Ninth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, made several rulings of first impression regarding Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”).4  The U.S. Supreme Court 
recently ruled on one of those issues, and that issue is the subject of this 
 
 1. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., 
dissenting), rev’d, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002). 
 2. Id. at 1123. 
 3. Id. at 1124. 
 4. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).  The 
three issues of first impression addressed by the Barnett court were: (1) “the nature and scope of 
an employer’s obligation to engage in the interactive process”; (2) “whether reassignment is a 
reasonable accommodation in the context of a seniority system”; and (3) “the appropriate 
standard for evaluating retaliation claims under the ADA.”  Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1108. 
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article.5  The issue, as stated by Petitioner, US Airways, Inc., is “[w]hether the 
[ADA] requires an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a position as a 
‘reasonable accommodation’ even though another employee is entitled to hold 
the position under the employer’s bona fide and established seniority system.”6  
Two basic methods of treating seniority policies in relation to the duty to 
reasonably accommodate through reassignment developed prior to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling on this issue.  The majority of courts had held that 
reassignment in violation of a bona fide seniority policy is a per se bar to 
reassignment being a reasonable accommodation.7  However, there is some 
support for a balancing approach like that applied by the Ninth Circuit in 
Barnett.8  Despite sharp criticism of its ruling, and subsequent reversal and 
remand by the Supreme Court, the majority correctly came to the conclusion 
that the balancing approach is the more appropriate resolution of this issue.  
Considering the plain language of the ADA, the legislative history of the ADA, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) regulations 
under the ADA and public policy, a per se bar is not permissible. 
B. Brief Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Title I of the ADA addresses discrimination in the employment sector.9  
The general nondiscrimination rule of the ADA reads: “No covered entity shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the 
 
 5. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002). 
 6. Brief for Petitioner at i, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002) (No. 00-
1250). 
 7. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120 n.9 (citing Feliciano v.  Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st 
Cir. 1998); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1997); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 
F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995); Willis v. Pac. Maritime 
Ass’n, 162 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 1998), aff’d en banc, 244 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2001); Milton v. 
Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 
F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000)).  The term “bona fide” has been used as a modifier of seniority 
policy to indicate that if there is direct proof of an employer seeking a seniority policy in order to 
avoid obligations under the ADA, that seniority policy will not be a bar to reassignment as a 
reasonable accommodation.  See, e.g., Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1046 n.7.  In addition, some courts have 
required a “well established” seniority policy, which means if the policy has not been uniformly 
followed, the seniority policy will not necessarily bar reassignment in violation of the seniority 
policy as a reasonable accommodation.  See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 
1176 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 8. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1119-1120.  See, e.g., Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. 
Supp. 393, 396-97 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).  The ADA has four titles.  As mentioned, Title I deals 
with discrimination in employment. Title II concerns discrimination by public agencies and 
public transportation.  Id. §§ 12131-12165.  Title III addresses private entities that have facilities 
open to the public, which must be made accessible to disabled individuals.  Id. §§ 12181-12189.  
The last title, Title IV, contains miscellaneous provisions.  Id. §§ 12201-12213. 
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disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”10  The 
term “covered entity” applies to employers as well as labor organizations.  
Discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the 
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with 
a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of such covered entity.”11  Restated, a covered entity 
is required to provide reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee 
unless such reasonable accommodation would impose an undue hardship upon 
the covered entity. 
Reasonable accommodation includes “job restructuring, part-time or 
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or 
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications 
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified 
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities.”12  Reassignment to a vacant position indicates, and the legislative 
history confirms, that employers are not required to “bump” other employees.13  
Under the express language of the ADA, both modifications of existing 
policies and reassignment to a vacant position can be reasonable.14  Therefore, 
it should follow that modification of the seniority policy to allow a 
reassignment is reasonable, unless the position is not “vacant,” or it causes 
undue hardship upon the employer.  Courts, however, have come to differing 
results regarding this issue based on their interpretation of the ADA. 
Most courts have reached the conclusion that a per se bar to reassignment 
in violation of a bona fide seniority policy is required under the ADA.15  Under 
 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
 11. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 12. Id. § 12111(9)(B). 
 13. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 63 (1989); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 
1154, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1999).  The term “bumping” means that an employee currently holds the 
position that the disabled employee is seeking as a reasonable accommodation. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (“The term reasonable accommodation may include . . . 
reassignment to a vacant position [and] . . . appropriate adjustment or modifications of . . . 
policies . . . .”). 
 15. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Davis 
v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000); Willis v. Pac. Maritime 
Ass’n, 162 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 1998); Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 
1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 
F.3d 76, 83 (3rd Cir. 1997); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 
F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995)).  Generally, these courts have either been the district courts, or 
appellate courts reviewing de novo the granting of a summary judgment motion.  See, e.g., 
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the per se bar, if the disabled employee seeks reassignment to a position which 
a more senior employee has a right to under a bona fide seniority policy, 
reassignment is, as a matter of law, not a reasonable accommodation.16  
However, some courts, such as Barnett, have applied a balancing approach.17  
Under this approach, a seniority policy is but one factor in determining 
whether the requested employment action is a reasonable accommodation or 
whether it imposes an undue hardship such that the employer need not provide 
accommodation.18  The Supreme Court articulated an entirely different rule, 
establishing a rebuttable presumption that creating an exception within a 
seniority system is unreasonable.19  This could be overcome by the disabled 
employee proving special circumstances exist so that creating an exception to 
the seniority policy is not unreasonable.20 This approach most closely 
resembles a per se bar because the Supreme Court indicated that it would be a 
very rare case in which the employee may overcome the presumption of 
unreasonableness. 
C. Scope and Importance of Issue 
The seniority system in Barnett was a policy of US Airways, and not 
associated with a collective bargaining agreement negotiated with a union.  
This distinction, however, was not a critical factor in the Supreme Court’s 
determination of the issue.21  The Supreme Court’s decision, issued on April 
29, 2002, will have a significant impact on all seniority systems and on those 
policies as a result of disability claims under the ADA.  This article will 
address both employer created and union negotiated seniority policies.22  The 
 
Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co, 875 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (district court decision); 
Eckles, 94 F.3d 1041 (appellate court reviews grant of summary judgment de novo). 
 16. See, e.g., Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051 (“[W]e conclude that the ADA does not require 
disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide 
seniority rights of other employees.”). 
 17. Barnett, 228 F.3d 1105. 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 1119-1120. 
 19. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1525 (2002). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1524-25.  The Court held that seniority systems, whether employer-imposed or 
contained within a collective bargaining agreement, create the same expectations for non-disabled 
employees.  Id. 
 22. Seniority systems are of great importance in the employment arena.  Franks v. Bowman 
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976).  Seniority is usually awarded according to service time 
with the company.  An employee who has been employed at the particular employer will have 
more seniority than another employer with less service time at that employer.  These seniority 
policies may give more senior employees preferential treatment in decisions concerning layoff 
and recall procedures, promotions, transfers, demotions, shift assignment, preference in 
scheduling vacation time, overtime opportunities, parking privileges, and other similar benefits. 
Id. at 766-67. 
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determination of this issue could also have a significant impact on other 
employer-created policies such as mandatory overtime policies or non-transfer 
policies.  It could also affect analysis of similar provisions in other acts such as 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23  This article will address these 
other possible impacts only peripherally, while focusing on the issue of 
accommodating disabled employees in companies with seniority systems. 
This Comment will be organized into three additional sections.  Section II 
will address the Supreme Court’s decision in full, including the concurring and 
dissenting opinions.24  Section II will also discuss prior cases that chose either 
to adopt a balancing approach or a per se bar.  This Comment advocates the 
balancing approach adopted in the Ninth Circuit decision in Barnett, which 
will be a focus of Section II.  Section III will separate and analyze the major 
issues that arise when answering this question, and why each supports a 
balancing approach or a per se bar.  This section will include an analysis of the 
ADA and its legislative history, public policy arguments, the problem of 
conflict between the ADA and National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”),25 
and the appropriateness of resolving this issue through court action as opposed 
to legislative action.  Finally, Section IV will be a conclusion offering a 
summary of the points made and a proposed resolution of this issue. 
 
  The Ninth Circuit in Barnett differentiated between cases involving a collective 
bargaining agreement, as opposed to a unilaterally imposed employer policy.  Barnett, 228 F.3d 
at 1120 n.9.  The difference lies in the burden it imposes upon other employees.  No matter 
whether the seniority policy is a result of collective bargaining or employer imposed, expectation 
rights of an employee whose seniority rights are displaced are involved.  Where there is a 
collective bargaining agreement, the contractual rights of the employees affected by a reasonable 
accommodation are also involved.  This distinction should be considered by the fact finder in 
deciding whether a particular accommodation is a “reasonable accommodation.”  Emrick v. 
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396-97 (E.D. Tex. 1995).  If a collective bargaining 
agreement is in effect it will be another factor to consider in the undue hardship analysis, along 
with expectations employees have under a seniority policy, whether part of a collective 
bargaining agreement or not.  Therefore, in either situation the balancing approach should be used 
rather than a per se bar to reassignment. 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2000). 
 24. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.  Justices Stevens and O’Connor both 
wrote separate concurrences.  Opposing them were a dissent by Justice Scalia, which Justice 
Thomas joined, and a dissent by Justice Souter, which Justice Ginsburg joined.  US Airways, Inc. 
v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002). 
 25. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (2000). 
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II.  SUMMARY OF POSITIONS 
A. Factual History of Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc. 
In Barnett, the plaintiff, Robert Barnett, injured his back while working in 
a cargo position for US Airways.26  Upon returning from disability leave, 
Barnett realized he could no longer physically perform the functions required 
by the cargo position.27  This claim was supported by Barnett’s doctor and 
chiropractor, both of whom recommended Barnett avoid heavy lifting and 
prolonged periods of bending, twisting, turning, pushing and pulling, and 
prolonged periods of sitting and standing.28  Subsequently, Barnett used his 
seniority to transfer to a mailroom position, which his doctor had approved.29  
After almost two years of service in the mailroom, Barnett became aware that 
two employees were going to exercise their seniority rights to obtain positions 
in the mailroom.30  After being bumped by these employees, Barnett’s 
seniority would only allow him to take a cargo position like the one he had 
previously held and could not perform due to his disability.31  Barnett sent a 
letter to US Airways requesting that he be allowed to stay in the mailroom as a 
reasonable accommodation.32  US Airways did not respond for five months, 
but during that period he was allowed to stay in the mailroom.33  After five 
months, US Airways informed Barnett that he would not be allowed to stay in 
the mailroom position due to the seniority rights of the more senior 
employees.34  As an alternative to remaining in the mailroom, Barnett asked 
for certain accommodations that would enable him to perform a cargo 
position.35  US Airways denied all requested accommodations and proposed 
only that Barnett could bid for any job within his restrictions, which did not 
provide Barnett any resolution since the only job available would still have 
 
 26. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1108.  What this group of cargo positions entailed was not 
elaborated, but for the purposes of this article it is only important that it required heavy lifting that 
Mr. Barnett was unable to perform as a result of the back problems he suffered from and that no 
accommodation within those positions could be agreed to by Mr. Barnett and US Airways. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  The seniority policy of US Airways allowed more senior employees to bump less 
senior employees upon application by the more senior employees who wanted to change jobs.  Id. 
at 1108-09. 
 30. Id. at 1108-09. 
 31. Barnett, 228 F.3d. at 1109. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1108-09. 
 35. Id. at 1109.  Mr. Barnett requested a mechanical lifting device or restructuring of the 
cargo position as possible accommodations that would allow him to resume work in a cargo 
position.  Id. 
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been the cargo position, which he could not perform without reasonable 
accommodation.36 
B. Rebuttable Presumption—Supreme Court Resolution of US Airways, Inc. 
v. Barnett 
Justice Breyer’s opinion started its analysis by reciting the general non-
discrimination rule the ADA creates—”[A]n employer who fails to make 
‘reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
[employee] with a disability’ discriminates ‘unless’ the employer ‘can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of [its] business.’”37  Justice Breyer then considered US Airways’ 
contention that the ADA requires only equal treatment for persons with 
disabilities, not preferential treatment.38  Justice Breyer rejected that claim, and 
indicated that the ADA does, in fact, require preferential treatment for 
individuals with disabilities in the form of reasonable accommodations.39  
Justice Breyer went on to add, “the fact that the difference in treatment violates 
an employer’s disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation 
beyond the [ADA’s] potential reach.”40  Justice Breyer also rejected US 
Airways’ argument that, since the seniority system creates rights to all 
positions in the company, none of the positions can be considered “vacant,” 
and, therefore, reassignment is not required because the ADA prohibits 
reassignment to a position that is not vacant.41 
Justice Breyer noted that the ADA requires an employee to demonstrate 
that reasonable accommodation is possible, and the ADA requires that the 
employer is to prove that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
and is, therefore, not required.42  In considering the employee’s required 
showing that reasonable accommodation is possible, Justice Breyer stated that 
reassignment to a vacant position would normally be reasonable, but for the 
seniority system in place.43  He announced that requiring proof that a seniority 
system should prevail on a case-by-case basis was not required, because “in the 
run of cases” reassignment in violation of a seniority system will be 
 
 36. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1109.  There was no evidence of whether Barnett was qualified, 
without accommodation, to any other position.  Id. 
 37. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1519 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(5)(A) (2000)). 
 38. Id. at 1520-21. 
 39. Id. at 1521. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1521. 
 42. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1523. 
 43. Id.  at 1523-24. 
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unreasonable.44  Justice Breyer noted the following factors as reasons that 
varying a seniority system will normally be unreasonable. 
First, Justice Breyer cited analogous case law, including decisions under 
Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act and several Circuits’ rulings under the ADA.45  
According to Justice Breyer, the key to this case was the expectation created 
by seniority systems, regardless of whether they are contained within a 
collective bargaining agreement or unilaterally imposed by an employer, on 
other employees.  The opinion indicated that the confusion created by a case-
by-case determination would undermine seniority systems and the consistent, 
uniform approach they create to assigning employees to positions.46  Justice 
Breyer’s rule, however, still requires difficult case-by-case determinations.  He 
permits an employee to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness by 
showing that other employees did not have justified expectations.47  This could 
result from such things as an employer reserving the right to change a seniority 
system unilaterally, which does, in fact, make many exceptions to the seniority 
policy, and, thus, reduces expectations of other employees to the point that 
“one further exception is unlikely to matter.”48 
Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurrence to note that a seniority system 
is relevant to whether an accommodation is reasonable, but not to whether an 
accommodation creates an undue burden as the court of appeals had ruled.49  
This is not a critical issue, but it does relate to who carries the burden of proof.  
Employees have the burden to prove that reasonable accommodation is 
possible; employers carry the burden of proving that a particular 
accommodation poses an undue hardship and is, therefore, not required.50  In 
the grand scheme of the ADA, this distinction does not matter.  Courts can 
either rule that the employee has the burden of proving the accommodation is 
reasonable, or that the employers must prove the accommodation poses an 
undue hardship—as the Supreme Court did in Barnett, ruling that an employee 
must prove the accommodation is reasonable. 
Justice O’Connor wrote a concurrence to indicate that she would base her 
rule in this situation upon whether the seniority system in place creates a 
legally enforceable right to a position.51  If it does, then the position is not 
vacant, and reassignment to that position could not be a reasonable 
 
 44. Id. at 1524. 
 45. Id.  ADA cases relied upon by Justice Breyer included Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 
F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999), Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1998), 
and Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996).  Id. 
 46. Id. at 1524-25. 
 47. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1525. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1525-26 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. at 1526. 
 51. Id. at 1526-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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accommodation.52  Justice O’Connor joined Justice Breyer’s opinion because it 
would produce similar results.53 
Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, which Justice Thomas joined.  This dissent 
basically announced the unsupported view that the ADA required modification 
only to those policies that are disability related.54  Since a seniority policy does 
not relate specifically to Barnett’s disability, it cannot be a reasonable 
accommodation.55  This Comment will not address this dissent beyond 
pointing out a few of its shortcomings.  Justice Scalia cited the ADA’s list of 
possible accommodations and then proceeded to discuss some of them and 
why they supported his proposition that only reasonable accommodations 
directed at disability-related obstacles were required.56  He discussed two of 
the listed accommodations, “modification of equipment and devises” and 
“provisions of qualified readers or interpreters,” which do support his position.  
These are accommodations directed to obstacles directly related to an 
employee’s disability.  However, Justice Scalia conveniently did not discuss 
other listed accommodations that did not support his contention, such as 
“appropriate adjustment or modification of . . . policies.”57  Another flaw of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion was that it cited the EEOC as generally supportive of 
his position, when, in fact, the EEOC has explicitly supported a rule that would 
permit variance of a seniority policy as a reasonable accommodation.58  Lastly, 
Justice Scalia’s opinion indicated that even in a situation where the employer 
has created multiple exceptions to the seniority policy, one more exception for 
disabled employees would be too burdensome because the other employees 
still expect the existing exceptions to be the only exceptions.59  As discussed 
later in this article, this is a situation where permitting variance of a seniority 
policy would be most justifiable because the other employees’ expectations are 
not quite as strong. 
Finally, Justice Souter offered a dissenting opinion in which Justice 
Ginsburg joined.  This dissent supports a balancing approach such as that 
supported by this Comment and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case.  This 
 
 52. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1527. 
 53. Id. at 1526. 
 54. Id. at 1528 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 1529. 
 56. Id. at 1530 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000)). 
 57. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1530.  Interestingly enough, most courts that have 
discussed this issue have overlooked the fact that adjustment or modification of policies is 
specifically included in the non-exhaustive list of reasonable accommodations contained in 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(9).  This could be because they view reassignment to a vacant position as more 
closely analogous to varying a seniority policy. 
 58. Id. at 1530-31.  See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and 
Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Compl. Manual (CCH), No. 
915.002, § 902, at 5440 (Mar. 1, 1999) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance]. 
 59. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1531. 
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dissent notes that reasonable accommodation can include reassignment to a 
vacant position.60  Although many provisions of the ADA have been modeled 
after Title VII, the ADA did not include a provision specifically removing 
variances in seniority systems from the definition of reasonable 
accommodation as Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act did.61  In Justice 
Souter’s opinion, this omission created an ambiguity that can be resolved by 
the legislative history of the ADA.62  However, Justice Souter’s dissent did 
depart from the balancing approach in one significant way.  Justice Souter 
indicated that the legislative history was not enough to overcome laws that 
provided for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.63  It was 
enough, however, to indicate that employer-imposed seniority systems, which 
do not have special protection by law, cannot be a bar to reasonable 
accommodation.64  This was especially true here, where the seniority policy 
was contained in an employee handbook that was not intended to create 
enforceable contractual rights, and allowed US Airways to change any and all 
policies without advanced notice.65  Based on this language, Justice Souter 
indicated that Barnett had met his burden by proving that variance in the 
seniority policy would be a reasonable accommodation, and the burden, 
consequently, was passed to US Airways to prove that this accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship.66 
C. Ninth Circuit Ruling in Barnett—Judge Fletcher’s Majority Opinion 
The majority of the Barnett court considered, among other things, whether 
US Airways should be required to make an exception to its company’s 
seniority policy in order to accommodate Barnett’s disability.  The majority 
cited the ADA as explicitly recognizing reassignment as a reasonable 
accommodation.67  Then the court narrowed in on the key issues: (1) whether a 
disabled employee seeking reassignment as a reasonable accommodation 
should be given priority over non-disabled employees seeking the same 
 
 60. Id. at 1532. 
 61. Id. at 1532-33. 
 62. Id. at 1533 (citing both a House Report and Senate Report indicating that a collective 
bargaining agreement is but one factor to consider in reasonable accommodation determinations). 
 63. Id. 
 64. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1533. 
 65. Id. at 1534. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 
121 S. Ct. 1600 (2001), rev’d, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002) (“The ADA explicitly states that reasonable 
accommodation may include reassignment.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000)).  Within 
the definition of “reasonable accommodation,” “reassignment to a vacant position” is included.  
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000). 
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position and (2) whether a seniority system was a per se bar to reassignment as 
a reasonable accommodation.68 
Addressing the first issue, the majority relied upon the EEOC’s guidance 
to support the proposition that the ADA does require giving a disabled 
employee a reassignment if that person is qualified for the position.69  If this 
were not the case, the reassignment requirement “would be of little value and 
would not be implemented as Congress intended.”70  The majority then cited 
en banc decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the 
Tenth Circuit to support the assertion that the ADA requires more from 
employers than simply giving disabled employees a chance to compete for 
reassignment on an equal basis with non-disabled employees.71 
The majority then moved on to the second issue, considering whether an 
employer’s unilaterally created seniority policy is a per se bar to reassignment.  
The court noted that no other circuit had directly addressed this question.72  
After finding the text of the ADA offered no help, the court reviewed the 
ADA’s legislative history.  The court found no history speaking to seniority 
systems outside the collective bargaining context, but did discover that the 
available legislative history rejected a per se bar to reassignment in violation of 
a seniority policy.73  The legislative history envisioned collective bargaining 
agreements containing a provision that allowed employers to take all necessary 
steps to comply with the ADA and alert their employees that the seniority 
policy may, in certain circumstances, be violated.74 
To support their reading of the legislative history, the Barnett majority 
again cited the EEOC’s position.75 The EEOC Compliance Manual supports a 
fact specific analysis, treating the collective bargaining agreement as another 
 
 68. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1117. 
 69. Id. at 1118 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5456). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (citing Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Smith v. 
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 72. Id. (noting that all other decisions have involved a collective bargaining agreement’s 
seniority policy, or simply have been dicta as is the case with Aka, 156 F.3d 1284 and Smith, 180 
F.3d 1154). 
 73. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1119 (“The legislative history indicates that a collective bargaining 
agreement can be a factor in determining the reasonableness of an accommodation but rejects any 
per se bar.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32 
(1989))). 
 74. Id. (“[B]oth reports envision that collective bargaining agreements will incorporate 
provisions allowing for compliance with the ADA ‘by ensuring that agreements negotiated after 
the effective date of this title contain a provision permitting the employer to take all actions 
necessary to comply with this legislation.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63; S. REP. 
NO. 101-116, at 32)). 
 75. Id.  (“In the EEOC’s view, such a per se rule nullifies Congress’ intent that undue 
hardship always be determined on a case-by-case basis.”) (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, 
supra note 58, at 5463). 
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factor in the undue hardship analysis.76  Accordingly, the analysis would start 
by examining whether the employer could provide a reasonable 
accommodation that would both remove the workplace barrier and not violate 
the collective bargaining agreement.77  If such an accommodation was not 
possible, the ADA would require the employer and the union, as exclusive 
bargaining representative, to engage in good faith negotiation in an effort to 
find an agreeable variance in the collective bargaining agreement which would 
allow the employer to provide a reasonable accommodation.78  This 
accommodation would then be put in place, unless it unduly burdened other 
workers’ expectations.79  Relevant factors to consider in determining the undue 
burden upon other employees include “the duration and severity of any adverse 
effects caused by granting a variance and the number of employees whose 
employment opportunities would be affected by the variance.”80 
After discussing the EEOC position, the Barnett court reasoned that, in the 
absence of a collective bargaining agreement, where no bargained-for rights 
were involved, seniority without a showing of undue hardship should not bar 
reassignment.81  The Barnett court also recognized other enumerated factors 
under the ADA to consider in an undue hardship analysis, “including the cost 
of the accommodation, the overall financial resources of the company and the 
scope of the employer’s operations.”82  Finally, the court differentiated ADA 
cases from Title VII cases because the ADA does not have language protecting 
“bona fide seniority systems” as Title VII does.83  The “undue hardship” 
requirement under the ADA is “substantially more demanding” than the same 
standard in Title VII.84 
Concluding that the ADA can require an employer to disregard a bona fide 
seniority system, and that such a system is simply one factor in the undue 
hardship analysis, the court proceeded to apply the undue hardship analysis to 
the situation at hand.  The court first looked at the extent of impact on other 
 
 76. Id. (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5463). 
 77. Id. (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5463). 
 78. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1119 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5463). 
 79. Id. (citing at EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5463). 
 80. Id. (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5463). 
 81. Id. (“Here, where there is no collective bargaining agreement, no bargained for rights are 
involved.  It would seem that the seniority system without more should not bar reassignment.”) 
 82. Id. at 1120 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2000)). 
 83. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120 n.10 (citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000)).  This 
section of Title VII states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, 
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or 
merit system . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000). 
 84. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120 n.10 (“We note that the ‘undue hardship’ standard in the ADA 
is substantially more demanding than the hardship standard in Title VII in the context of 
‘reasonable accommodation’ for the religion of employees.”). 
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employees if Barnett were allowed to keep his position despite the other 
employees’ greater seniority.85  The court expressly noted that reasonable 
accommodation does not require the “bumping” of another employee.86  But 
the court did not view this employment action as bumping and concluded that 
the only adverse effect of accommodation would be the removal of one 
position from the seniority bid process.87  In its analysis, the court also 
considered the number of ADA claimants employed by US Airways, the 
claimants’ seniority levels and the claimants’ need for reasonable 
accommodation that violated the seniority policy.88  The court finally held that 
US Airways did not present enough evidence to support its claim that 
removing one position from the seniority bid process would unduly disrupt the 
seniority process. 
In Justice O’Scannlain’s dissent, joined by Justices Trott and Kleinfeld, the 
main point of contention was that Barnett was not disabled as defined in the 
ADA.89  Relying on Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital,90 the dissent refused 
to accept a twenty-five pound lifting restriction as substantially limiting the 
major life activity of working.91  In order to be disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA, an individual must be substantially limited in a “major life 
activity.”92  However, the majority in Barnett made a compelling case that this 
 
 85. Id. at 1120. The Barnett court viewed the situation at the time of the adverse 
employment action, and, therefore, considered Barnett to be the current occupant of the mailroom 
position. 
 86. Id. at 1120.  There is disagreement over the meaning of  the term “bumping.”  Under a 
strict interpretation, bumping would mean only taking a position which is currently filled by 
another employee.  This is the approach adopted by the majority in Barnett.  Id. at 1120.  
However, other courts have defined it much more broadly.  See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, 
Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).  The court in Smith held that any position, even if not 
currently occupied, is not vacant if another, more senior, employee under a seniority policy has a 
right to the position; therefore, any such variation to a seniority policy would require bumping.  
Id. at 1175. 
 87. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120.  The court further stated: 
Barnett already occupied the mail room position at the time of his request for reasonable 
accommodation.  Therefore, permanently reassigning Barnett to the mail room position as 
a reasonable accommodation did not require “bumping” any other employee from the 
position.  While this accommodation would eliminate one position from the seniority bid 
process, U.S. Air has failed to demonstrate that doing so would cause an undue hardship. 
Id. 
 88. Id. at 1120-21. 
 89. Id. at 1123. 
 90. 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1997).  For further discussion of this issue, see Lown v. J.J. Eaton 
Place, 598 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
 91. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1123 (“The similarities between Thompson and the instant case, in 
terms of both the plaintiff’s claimed disabilities and the employer’s responses thereto, are 
striking.  Under Thompson, it is clear that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Barnett’s 
disability.”). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). 
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was not a determinative issue.93  The majority ruled that since U.S. Airways 
did not raise the issue as a cross-appeal in its opening or reply brief, the issue 
was waived.94  Additionally, Thompson was distinguished because Barnett had 
restrictions beyond simply a twenty-five pound lifting restriction.95 
Judge Trott wrote a separate dissent to indicate that the majority opinion 
leaves employers, employees and lawyers with no guidance and invites 
litigation.96  Judge Trott viewed this as a question for Congress to resolve 
rather than the courts.97  Judge Trott then reprinted Judge Wiggins’ opinion 
from the Ninth Circuit’s original decision in this case, which was subsequently 
replaced after the en banc hearing.98  In that opinion, the legislative history of 
the ADA was considered ambiguous on the subject.  This ambiguity existed 
because Judge Wiggins viewed the situation involved in this case as employee 
bumping.99  The majority viewed this case differently from bumping because 
there were no other options under the seniority system for the disabled 
employee.100  Then, based upon that ambiguity, Judge Wiggins relied on cases 
from other circuits that held that reasonable accommodation does not require 
exempting a disabled employee from a collectively bargained seniority 
system.101  Judge Wiggins expressed the view that the ADA, in no way, 
requires disabled employees be given preference over non-disabled 
employees.102  This conforms to one line of reasoning used by courts to reach 
the conclusion that a per se bar should be applied. 
D. Cases Addressing the Barnett Decision 
Some courts had addressed the issue after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 
Barnett, but before the Supreme Court’s resolution of the issue.  These courts 
declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach.  In a case involving an 
employer created seniority policy, EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp.,103 the Fourth 
Circuit declined to follow Barnett.  In a later Ninth Circuit decision, Willis v. 
 
 93. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1111 n.1. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  (“Barnett faced further restrictions regarding prolonged standing or sitting and 
excessive or repeated bending, twisting, turning, stopping, pulling and pushing.”). 
 96. Id. at 1125 (Trott, J., dissenting) (“I am troubled by the regrettable position in which we 
leave employers, employees, and the lawyers who advise them in connection with these important 
and possibly costly decisions.  To require them to deal with a seniority system as ‘merely one 
factor’ leaves them with no guidance, none at all.”). 
 97. Id.  For further discussion of this issue see infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. 
 98. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1125. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1120. 
 101. Id. at 1125-26. 
 102. Id. at 1126. 
 103. 237 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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Pacific Maritime Association,104 Barnett was distinguished.  After discussing 
these cases, this article will then discuss one case, Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-
Ford Co.,105 which has adopted a balancing approach like that of Barnett.  This 
section will then conclude with a discussion of cases which have decided the 
issue in favor of a per se bar to modifying seniority policies, as most courts 
have. 
In Sara Lee, the court was confronted with an employer created seniority 
system.106  This case involved an epileptic employee, Vanessa Turpin, who 
was only able to work if allowed to remain on the day shift.107  After a plant 
closing, as per the seniority system, the displaced employees were able to work 
at another plant and displace less senior employees.108  An employee with 
twenty years of seniority more than Turpin requested the day shift at the plant 
at which Turpin worked and would have displaced Turpin to the second or 
third shift, which she was unable to work.109  The company refused her request 
to bypass the seniority system, and suggested three options for reasonable 
accommodation.  All three options were in conformance with the seniority 
system, but would not allow Turpin to effectively perform the essential 
functions of the job.110 
 
 104. 244 F.3d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).  The original opinion in Willis was 
rendered before the en banc hearing of Barnett.  See Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n., 162 F.3d 561 (9th 
1998).  After the Ninth Circuit en banc hearing in Barnett, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, en banc, 
the Willis decision and superceded the first Willis decision.  244 F.3d 675.  In that decision, the 
Ninth Circuit distinguished Barnett based on the fact that the seniority policy in Willis was 
contained within a collective bargaining agreement, as opposed to being unilaterally implemented 
by the employer.  Willis, 244 F.3d at 680-81. 
 105. 875 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Tex. 1995).  The District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
decision held that a seniority policy, whether within a collective bargaining agreement or not, is 
only one factor in determining the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation under the ADA.  
The district court found no prior case to have decided on the issue in this opinion handed down on 
February 8, 1995.  Id. at 396. 
 106. Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 351. 
 107. Id.  Ms. Turpin, despite taking medication and seeing a neurologist, suffered occasional 
seizures.  The worst of these seizures would occur nocturnally.  The nocturnal seizures would 
cause shaking, kicking, salivating, and, at least once, bedwetting.  After the nocturnal seizures, 
Ms. Turpin would often be left bruised, exhausted and unrested.  Some of the daytime seizures 
had occurred while Ms. Turpin was working.  She could feel the seizures coming on, and sit 
elsewhere until the seizure would end.  After the seizure she was able to return to what she had 
been previously doing.  Id. at 350-51. 
 108. Id. at 351.  Ms. Turpin worked at Sara Lee’s Florence, South Carolina plant.  When the 
Hartsville, South Carolina plant closed, under Sara Lee’s internal seniority policy, the displaced 
employees could use their seniority to replace less senior employees at other plants.  One of the 
employees from the Hartsville plant requested Ms. Turpin’s position, had twenty more years 
seniority than did Turpin, and so had a right to the position under the seniority policy.  Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  Sara Lee “gave Turpin three options, all based upon the seniority policy: 1) move to 
the second or third shift; 2) go on layoff status with recall rights for twelve months (including the 
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The court started its analysis by citing the ADA’s requirement that an 
employer is required to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee, unless 
it was shown to be an undue hardship.111  The court also found that the 
reasonable accommodation requirement, beyond not imposing an undue 
hardship, had to be “reasonable.”112  The court recognized the weight of 
authority holding that an employer need not violate a non-discriminatory 
policy as a reasonable accommodation.113  The court next announced that a 
seniority policy is the perfect example of a policy to which the employer is 
entitled to respect.114  The court recognized the fact in this case, which most 
other cases did not have to consider, that Turpin was requesting to stay in her 
position, not to displace another worker who had greater seniority.  However, 
without analysis, the court stated that “[t]his is a distinction without a 
difference.”115  The court made no attempt to consider what effect allowing 
Turpin to remain in her position would produce.116  The court simply reasoned 
that requiring Sara Lee to bypass the seniority system would expose it to 
litigation from any employees who were not given the benefit they expected 
under the seniority system.117  The court finished by stating a reasonable 
accommodation requiring variance to a seniority policy would make the ADA 
into a mandatory preference statute, rather than an anti-discrimination statute 
as it is meant to be.118 
 
right to be recalled to a first shift position should one become available); or 3) take a severance 
package.”  Id. 
 111. Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 353. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 353 (“Virtually all circuits that have considered the issue have held the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodation standard does not require an employer to abandon a legitimate and 
non-discriminatory company policy.”). 
 114. Id. at 354 (“Although the ADA allows an employee to transfer to a vacant position, 
Turpin has no statutory right to supercede Sara Lee’s seniority system.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Presumably the employee with twenty years experience requesting the day shift is not 
the one who will be affected, but rather the person with the next lowest seniority to Turpin.  This 
is because of the “trickle down” effect of seniority policies.  The more senior employee, not being 
able to replace the disabled employee, will take the next best position, displacing a less senior 
employee.  This less senior employee could then displace an employee with lower seniority, and 
down the line until the employee actually displaced has seniority similar to or worse than the 
disabled employee.  This trickle down effect would lessen the individual burden since the 
displaced employee was actually one with slightly more seniority than the employee who is most 
effected.  Also, there are other situations that would illustrate why the effect on other employees 
may not be so serious.  For example, requiring an employee to take the second or third shift after 
transferring to a different plant would be less of a burden than if the employee had no job 
available at all. 
 117. Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 355.  For a discussion of why this argument is unpersuasive, see 
infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text. 
 118. Id. (citing Dalton v. Suburu-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 679, 679 (7th Cir. 1998) (A 
“contrary rule would convert a nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference statute, a 
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The Ninth Circuit distinguished Willis v. Pacific Maritime Association 
from Barnett because it involved a seniority policy created by a collective 
bargaining agreement instead of an employer-established seniority system.119  
The court in Willis stated that before the undue hardship analysis, it must first 
determine whether violating a collective bargaining agreement’s seniority 
system is an undue hardship per se or just a factor in the balancing analysis 
under the undue hardship standard.120  Willis cited eight circuits which have 
followed the per se bar,121 and noted that only one district court and several 
commentators suggested using the balancing approach.122  The court found that 
the collective bargaining agreement seniority system consisted of bargained-
for, contractual rights of other employees.  Thus, any request to bypass that 
system would be unreasonable, and it could not be evaluated through an undue 
hardship balancing test.123  The court then addressed the legislative history of 
the ADA suggesting a balancing approach rather than a per se bar.124  Despite 
this, the court rejected the balancing approach because Congress was fully 
aware of the “well-established precedent” which refused to require employers 
to violate a collective bargaining agreement’s bona fide seniority policy under 
Rehabilitation Act cases at the time the ADA was enacted.125  Moreover, 
Congress did not expressly rebut a per se bar within the language of the 
ADA.126  The court then announced that sound public policy supports a per se 
 
result which would be both inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an 
unreasonable imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled employees.”)). 
 119. Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
 120. Id. at 680. 
 121. Id. (citing Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 
F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 81-83 (3d Cir. 1997); Foreman v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 
1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 
1995); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
 122. Id. (citing Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396-97 (E.D. Tex. 
1995); William J. McDevitt, Seniority Systems and the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Fate 
of “Reasonable Accommodation” After Eckles, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359 (1997); Eric H.J. 
Stahlhut, Playing the Trump Card: May An Employer Refuse to Reasonably Accommodate Under 
the ADA by Claiming a Collective Bargaining Obligation?, 9 LAB. LAW. 71 (1993); Robert A. 
Dubault, The ADA and the NLRA: Balancing Individual and Collective Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 1271 
(1995)). 
 123. Id. at 681. 
 124. Willis, 244 F.3d at 681 (“We acknowledge that some of the legislative history suggests a 
balancing approach.”). 
 125. Id. at 681 (“However, we, like our sister circuits which have confronted the issue, must 
also recognize that Congress enacted the ADA fully aware of the ‘well established precedent’ 
under the Rehabilitation Act . . . and yet failed to include any provision to counter that 
precedent . . .”). 
 126. Id. 
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bar,127 because a balancing approach would place the employers in a situation 
where they had to guess whether a specific request was a reasonable 
accommodation.128  This guess would then put the employer in danger of 
violating the ADA, on the one hand, and the NLRA, on the other hand, for any 
employees who were bumped.129  In certain instances, the terms of the 
collectively bargained seniority policy are flexible enough to permit an 
accommodation of a less senior employee.  The court in Willis did not rule on 
the question of whether such an accommodation could be required under the 
ADA.130  The court also defined “bona fide seniority system” as one created 
for legitimate purposes, and not for discriminatory purposes, and would allow 
a plaintiff to argue that the seniority system was not bona fide.131 
E. Support for a Balancing Approach 
Similar to Barnett, the court in Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford favored a 
rule in support of allowing such variation to a seniority policy depending on 
the results of a balancing test.132  In Emrick, the court first looked to decisions 
under the Rehabilitation Act, which are persuasive authority under the ADA.133  
Under the Rehabilitation Act, the generally accepted notion was that 
reassignment in violation of a collective bargaining agreement or seniority 
policy was per se unreasonable.134 The Supreme Court concluded that the 
routine operation of a bona fide seniority system does not infringe upon an 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Willis, 244 F.3d at 681-82 (“We are persuaded that it would be improper to subject an 
employer to the Hobson’s choice of violating the ADA or the NLRA, or at least subjecting itself 
to the threat of litigation under these statutes, depending on the outcome of a ‘balancing’ 
approach.”).  For a discussion of why this argument is unpersuasive, see infra notes 227-33 and 
accompanying text. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 682 (“Our decision does not preclude an employee from arguing that a proposed 
accommodation is reasonable despite a conflict with a [collective bargaining agreement] 
provision that does not contain a bona fide seniority system.”). 
 132. Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396-97 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
 133. Id. at 395.  Congress apparently borrowed the term “reasonable accommodation” from 
the EEOC regulations issued in implementing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and, for this reason, 
cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are considered to be guidance on this issue.  Eckles v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 134. Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 395 (citing Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467-68 (4th Cir. 
1987); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1251 (6th Cir. 1985); Daubert v. 
United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1368-72 (10th Cir. 1984); Florence v. Frank, 774 F. 
Supp. 1054, 1062 (N.D. Tex. 1991)); see also Rose Daly-Rooney, Note, Reconciling Conflicts 
Between the Americans With Disabilities Act and The National Labor Relations Act To 
Accommodate People With Disabilities, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 387, 394-95 (1994). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION vs. SENIORITY IN THE APPLICATION 197 
employee’s rights under the Rehabilitation Act.135  The court ruled that 
disrupting an employee’s expectations under a seniority policy would “greatly 
disrupt a settled and worked-for reliance on valid interests and 
expectations . . . .”136  Therefore, seniority rights should be given special 
weight to create a balance between the interests of the disabled employees in 
not being discriminated against and the non-disabled employees rights under 
the collective bargaining agreement.137 
The Emrick court then sought guidance from the legislative history of the 
ADA.  The court concluded that an employer cannot use a collective 
bargaining agreement to do what is otherwise forbidden under the Act.138  
Additionally, the court in Emrick pointed out that the list of reasonable 
accommodations in the ADA specifically includes reassignment.  Emrick also 
cited two commentators who have agreed that seniority should be a factor in 
the analysis of undue hardship and that a per se rule is inappropriate.139  
Recognition was made that the ADA does not require the employer bump 
another employee in order to create a vacancy.140  The court concluded this 
discussion by stating that the ADA requires assurance of equality for disabled 
employees, and not preference over other employees.141 
In addition to Emrick and Barnett, two other courts have indicated support 
for the balancing approach without actually making a determination of the 
issue.  In Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, the court stated in dicta that 
collective bargaining agreements should be read consistent with federal law 
and that the court was “skeptical” of whether a collective bargaining agreement 
could waive individual rights granted by the ADA.142  Citing Barnett, the court 
in Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank proposed that a disabled employee is to receive 
preferential treatment over non-disabled employees in reassignment 
 
 135. Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 396 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 
78-80 (1977); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 900-13 (1989)). 
 136. Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 396. 
 137. Id.  (“[T]o alter entitlements under a valid seniority system can greatly disrupt a settled 
and worked-for reliance on valid interests and expectations of many innocent workers.”) (citing 
Lorance, 490 U.S. at 904-09)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (citing Joanne Jocha Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 1991 DET. C. L. REV. 925 
(1991); Daly-Rooney, supra note 134).  See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). 
 140. Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 397. 
 141. Id. at 398. 
 142. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1303 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating the 
employer “would thus effectively be claiming that the [collective bargaining agreement] waives 
[the disabled employee’s] ADA rights.  Although we need not decide now whether such waivers 
are permissible, we are skeptical.”). 
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decisions.143  Both of these decisions, however, do not necessarily show a 
preference for a balancing approach, but rather a general disagreement with a 
per se bar.  Additionally, the decisions simply make a statement without any 
analysis beyond recognition of prior persuasive precedent.  As a result, these 
decisions do not possess a great deal of persuasive force, but they do indicate 
that some courts are willing to support an approach other than a per se bar to 
reassignment in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.  However, 
irrespective of the cases discussed in this section, a great majority of courts 
favor a per se bar to reassignment in violation of a seniority policy. 
F. Courts Adopting a Per Se Bar144 
In addressing whether employers are required to allow a variance in a 
collective bargaining agreement seniority policy, most circuits have adopted a 
per se bar.145  The reasoning throughout these circuits is generally very similar, 
and these courts have been increasingly ready to adopt the easy-to-apply per se 
bar in alignment with prior persuasive predecent, and not a balancing 
approach. 
In Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., the Seventh Circuit addressed the 
issue of which test to apply.146  The court in Eckles discussed the undue 
 
 143. Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 55, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“[W]hen 
reassignment of an existing employee is the issue, the disabled employee is entitled to preferential 
consideration.”). 
 144. The per se bar is generally subject to certain exceptions.  The main exception is for 
seniority provisions drafted with the intent to discriminate against disabled employees.  See, e.g., 
Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).  Courts will term the per 
se bar applying to “bona fide” or “legitimate” seniority policies.  See, e.g., Eckles v. Consol. Rail 
Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he collective bargaining agreement at issue did 
not subject [disabled employees] to prohibited discrimination by establishing a bona fide seniority 
system that regulates the holding of positions at Conrail.”); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 
349, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[R]easonable accommodation standard does not require an 
employer to abandon a legitimate and non-discriminatory company policy.”).  “A ‘bona fide’ 
seniority system is one that was created for legitimate purposes, rather than for the purpose of 
discrimination.” Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1046 n.7.  Another exception often stated involves situations 
where the policy is not “well-established,” meaning the policy has not been followed strictly in 
the past so that employees do not have legitimate expectations created from the policy.  See, e.g., 
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 145. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Davis 
v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000); Willis, 162 F.3d at 561; 
Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 
F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1997); Eckles, 94 F.3d 
at 1051; Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); Benson v. Northwest 
Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
 146. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1045-46. This case actually involved a situation in which the 
collective bargaining agreement allowed a more senior employee to be bumped by written 
agreement by the union and the employer.  Eckles was allowed to bump a more senior employee 
because the union and employer made an agreement.  Id. at 1044.  Later the union rescinded its 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION vs. SENIORITY IN THE APPLICATION 199 
hardship analysis, and pointed out that seniority systems pose a conflict 
between the disabled employee and his or her co-workers rather than the 
employer.147  Furthermore, the court found that an employer cannot use a 
contractual obligation to avoid an obligation imposed by the ADA.148  
However, in Eckles, this same challenge was dismissed because the plaintiff 
offered no evidence that the employer enacted the seniority system to bypass 
its obligations under the ADA.149  The court also relied on the definition of 
reasonable accommodation for guidance.  The tribunal found it significant that 
reassignment to a vacant position was included.150  By including the word 
“vacant,” it can be inferred that Congress did not intend other employees to be 
pushed from their positions to accommodate a disabled employee.151 
The Eckles court, however, found the express language of the ADA 
somewhat ambiguous.152  For this reason, the court reviewed the history of the 
term “reasonable accommodation” as applied under the ADA.  It found that 
Congress borrowed the term from the regulations issued by the EEOC during 
its implementation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.153  Because of the 
presence of these regulations, cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act were 
considered to be guidance on the issue.154  Those cases rejected the notion that 
employers should violate a seniority system as a reasonable accommodation 
under the Rehabilitation Act and a virtual per se rule developed.155  Because of 
this “well-established precedent,” Congress drafted the ADA with knowledge 
that the Rehabilitation Act had a per se bar to reassignment in violation of a 
 
agreement with the employer and a more senior employee was allowed to bump Eckles.  Id.  This 
resulted in Eckles having to take involuntary sick leave until he was able to find a job that he 
could perform and had seniority for.  Id.  Eckles then had a seizure and had to take involuntary 
sick leave; upon returning, the employer forced him to find a new position.  Id.  Eckles was able 
to successfully bid for a new job, but was still not protected from a more senior employee 
bumping him.  Id. 
 147. Id. at 1045-46. 
 148. Id. at 1046. 
 149. Id. (“Eckles does not claim that the seniority system was established, even in part, in 
order to bypass the duty to accommodate under the ADA; and there is no evidence of such 
subterfuge.”). 
 150. Id. at 1047. 
 151. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  The per se bar to violating a seniority system was subject to a requirement that the 
system be bona fide or non-discriminatory in civil rights cases under Title VII and the 
Rehabilitation Act.  Most courts currently maintain this requirement.  Some have stated this 
requirement by prohibiting negotiation of seniority provisions with “actual intent to 
discriminate . . . on the part of those who negotiated or maintained the [seniority] system.”  
Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 905 (1989) (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 
456 U.S. 273, 289 (1982). 
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seniority system.156  The court also noted that Title VII did not require 
violation of otherwise valid agreements such as the collectively bargained 
seniority rights of other employees.157  The court then reviewed the legislative 
history and also found it somewhat ambiguous, but, in general, more 
supportive of not requiring deviation from a seniority policy to provide a 
disabled employee a reasonable accommodation.158  The court recognized the 
decision in Emrick, but refused to accept its reasoning and conclusion that a 
balancing test should be applied.159  The court concluded that “the ADA does 
not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the 
collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.”160  The 
court pointed to other decisions coming to this conclusion as well.161 
The Tenth Circuit reached the same result in Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 
but the court tackled this issue in the context of a collective bargaining 
agreement in a slightly different way.162  The Smith court based its decision on 
the phrase “reassignment to a vacant position.”163  It found that this express 
language of the ADA did not allow bumping another employee in order to 
reassign a disabled employee.  The court reasoned that a position is not really 
vacant, even if not currently occupied, if another employee has a right to it 
under the seniority system.164  Since greater seniority meant that an employee 
has a right to the position, a disabled employee could not require the employer 
to violate the seniority system as a reasonable accommodation.165  While Smith 
did not adopt a per se bar to such reasonable accommodation, it came very 
close.  The Smith court stated that a seniority policy could be violated, but only 
if it was not so well entrenched or so well established that it gave legitimate 
expectations of a job to a more senior employee.166  This approach, while 
better than a per se bar, was limited only to circumstances in which an 
 
 156. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1048. 
 157. Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977)). 
 158. Id. at 1049. 
 159. Id. at 1050 n.15 (indicating also that Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 
1995), a subsequent decision in the same district, had already questioned the continued 
application of Emrick). 
 160. Id. at 1051. 
 161. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051 (listing Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 
(8th Cir. 1995); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995); Milton v. Scrivner, 
Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th 
Cir. 1995)). 
 162. 180 F.3d 1154, 1174-76 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 163. Id. at 1174-75.  The term “reassignment to a vacant position” is one of the examples of 
possible reasonable accommodations set out in the definition of “reasonable accommodation” in 
the ADA.  See infra text accompanying note 181; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000). 
 164. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1175. 
 165. Id. at 1175-76. 
 166. Id. at 1176. 
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employer has a history of granting variations in the seniority policy.  Where a 
union-negotiated seniority policy is in place, this will almost assuredly never 
occur.  Therefore, this possible exception will apply only to employer-created 
seniority systems, and only if the employer regularly grants variations in the 
policy.  The significance of this decision is not this limited exception, but the 
reasoning used to reach the court’s conclusion. 
Two general lines of reasoning have developed for not requiring employers 
to violate a collectively bargained for seniority provision.  The first is the view 
that no position is vacant if there is a more senior employee who desires the 
position.  Therefore, according to the express language of the ADA, an 
employer is not required to give a disabled employee a position over a more 
senior employee.  The second rationale comes to the same conclusion, but 
through a review of prior precedent, the express language of the ADA, the 
legislative history of the ADA, the rights of other employees and public policy.  
While this is the more universally accepted reasoning for protecting seniority 
policies, seniority policies are better balanced with other factors in determining 
whether the requested employment action is a reasonable accommodation or an 
undue hardship. 
III.   ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE ISSUES 
A. Prior Persuasive Precedent 
The most prevalent argument against reassigning a disabled employee in 
violation of a seniority policy is precedent.  Many courts have simply adopted 
the rule as it applies to collective bargaining agreements without analysis of 
the underlying issues.167  On the other hand, some courts have adopted the per 
se bar based on precedent, but then discussed some particular aspect of the 
underlying issues.  For example, in Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., the 
court cited a long line of precedent and then discussed in a footnote the 
adoption by the EEOC of a balancing approach.168  The court rejected the 
EEOC approach because it viewed the guidance as inconsistent with the ADA 
and with other courts’ previous reasoning on the issue. 
In EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., the court concluded that the provisions of a 
collective bargaining agreement should not be violated and went on to state 
that “[a] seniority system provides a prime example of a policy that a company 
 
 167. See Cameron v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1048 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 
1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Cochrum v. Old Ben 
Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912-13 (7th Cir. 1996); Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st 
Cir. 1998); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997); Kralik v. 
Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 82-83 (3d Cir. 1997); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
 168. 205 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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is entitled to respect.”169  The court discussed the effect of a violation on other 
employees and held that the unwanted related effect was the key to why a 
company cannot be required to violate the terms of a seniority policy.170  The 
court emphasized that other civil rights laws imposed costs on employers only 
and not on co-employees of the protected employee.171  A “contrary rule would 
convert a nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference statute, a 
result which would be both inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the 
ADA and an unreasonable imposition on the employers and coworkers of 
disabled employees.”172 
Although most courts had stated their holdings in terms of a seniority 
provision of a collective bargaining agreement without discussing the impact, 
if any, of an employer-created seniority provision outside a collective 
bargaining agreement, the Sara Lee court specifically stated that the source of 
the provision made no difference.173  Since the Supreme Court has issued its 
ruling in Barnett, there is controlling precedent that both sources should be 
treated similarly. 
B. Plain Language of the ADA 
In its statement of findings for the ADA, Congress stated that “the Nation’s 
proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of 
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals” and that, “the continuing existence of unfair 
and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities 
the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities 
for which our free society is justifiably famous.”174  In order to carry out 
enforcement of the ADA to ensure that these findings are addressed, a flexible, 
workable standard for the many different situations that arise under the ADA 
must be applied.175 
 
 169. 237 F.3d 349, 354 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 170. Id. at 354-55. 
 171. Id. (“All antidiscrimination statutes, from Title VII to the ADA, impose costs on 
employers. . . .  The difference in this case is that requiring an employer to break a legitimate and 
non-discriminatory policy tramples on the rights of other employees as well.”). 
 172. Id. at 355 (quoting Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir. 
1998)). 
 173. Id. (“No reason exists for creating a different rule for legitimate and non-discriminatory 
policies that are not a part of a collective bargaining agreement.  All workers—not just those 
covered by collective bargaining agreements—rely upon established company policies.”). 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)-(9) (2000). 
 175. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (2001) (EEOC Interpretive Guidance) (“[T]he employer must 
make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation. The appropriate 
reasonable accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that involves 
both the employer and the [employee] with a disability.”). 
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Title I of the ADA addresses discrimination in the employment sector.176  
The general nondiscrimination rule of the ADA states that “[n]o covered entity 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the 
disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”177  A 
covered entity is defined as “an employer, employment agency, labor 
organization, or joint labor-management committee.”178  Accordingly, both 
employers and labor unions are prohibited from discriminating under Title I of 
the ADA.  Discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations to 
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual 
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity 
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on 
the operation of the business of such covered entity.”179  A “qualified 
individual with a disability” is defined as “an individual with a disability who, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”180  
Restated, a covered entity is not required to provide reasonable 
accommodation to a disabled employee if such reasonable accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship. 
Reasonable accommodation includes “job restructuring, part-time or 
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or 
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications 
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified 
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations.”181  Two of these 
reasonable accommodations are pertinent to the present analysis, 
“reassignment to a vacant position” and “appropriate adjustment or 
modifications of . . . policies.” 
Reassignment to a vacant position indicates, and the legislative history 
confirms, that employers are not required to “bump” other employees.182  As 
discussed previously, what the term “vacant” means has been a key factor in 
some cases calling for a per se bar to variation of a seniority policy.183  In 
Eckles, the seniority policy allowed for more senior employees, if qualified, to 
bid on and receive a job even if a less senior employee already held that job.184  
 
 176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-17 (2000). 
 177. Id. § 12112(a). 
 178. Id. § 12111(2). 
 179. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 180. Id. § 12111(8). 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). 
 182. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 183. See, e.g., Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 184. Id. 
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The less senior employee would then have to bid for another job in which the 
employee was qualified and had greater seniority than the person that currently 
held the job.185  In this context, the court ruled that no position is vacant if 
there is a more senior, qualified employee because of the ability to bid for and 
receive any job held by a less senior employee.186  This is one of the 
ambiguities in the ADA.  Other courts have held that “vacant” would include 
any job not currently filled by an employee.187 
Appropriate adjustment or modification of policies as a reasonable 
accommodation is another somewhat ambiguous term in the ADA, which is a 
result of the ADA’s breadth.  This concept has not been applied in decisions 
regarding whether an employer must violate a seniority system to reassign an 
employee as a reasonable accommodation.  Presumably, this is because 
“reassignment to a vacant position” has been viewed as more on point with 
regard to this issue, since reassignment is the action to be taken.  Comparing 
these two possible accommodations, the key term is “vacant.”  Under the 
express language of the ADA, both modifications of existing policies and 
reassignment to a vacant position can be reasonable.188  Therefore, it follows 
that modification of a seniority policy to allow reassignment can be reasonable 
if the position is vacant, and if it does not cause undue hardship.  In light of 
this somewhat ambiguous language, it is necessary to consider whether the 
legislative history of this Act supports a reading that allows reassignment in 
violation of a seniority policy. 
C. Legislative History 
Both the House and the Senate Reports contain language to the effect that 
seniority policies are but one factor in determining whether an accommodation 
of a disabled employee would be a reasonable accommodation.189  Despite this 
language, courts have ruled seniority policies to be a per se bar to this sort of 
accommodation.190  Courts have focused on “well established precedent” that 
the Rehabilitation Act does not require violation of a “bona fide seniority 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. (“We also acknowledge that under a seniority system like that in place . . . [here], few 
positions are ever truly ‘vacant,’ in the sense of being unfilled.”). 
 187. See supra text accompanying note 164. 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000).  Both terms are included within a list of possible 
reasonable accommodations contained in the definition of “reasonable accommodation.”  Id. 
 189. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32 (1989).  The 
House Report stated: 
[I]f a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given 
amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a 
reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to 
the job.  However, the agreement would not be determinative on the issue. 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63. 
 190. See, e.g., Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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system” and reasoned that had Congress intended to change this rule, it would 
have been explicitly stated in the language of the ADA.191  As discussed above, 
however, the ADA does include language providing that reasonable 
accommodation may include “modifying . . . policies.”192 
Requiring employers and unions to grant variations in seniority policies is 
consistent with the approach envisioned by the drafters of the ADA.  The 
drafters were concerned with the wide spread unemployment of disabled 
Americans resulting in the poverty of these individuals.193  Reviewing a Lou 
Harris poll, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources recognized 
that two-thirds of working-age Americans with disabilities were not working 
despite sixty-six percent of these individuals preferring to work.194  In 
“absolute terms, this means that about 8.2 million people with disabilities want 
to work but cannot find a job.”195  This was costing taxpayers billions of 
dollars annually in support payments and lost income tax revenue and kept 
disabled Americans from becoming self-reliant, leaving them in unjust, 
unwanted dependency.196  These concerns would be better addressed through a 
flexible, case-by-case assessment of whether a violation of another employee’s 
seniority rights would be a reasonable accommodation or whether it would 
present an undue hardship for the employer or the labor union. 
This flexible approach is adopted in the legislative history of the ADA.  
The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources stated that “the 
decision as to what reasonable accommodation is appropriate is one of which 
must be determined based on the particular facts of the individual case.”197  A 
“fact-specific case-by-case approach to providing reasonable accommodation 
is generally consistent with the interpretations of [reasonable accommodation] 
 
 191. See, e.g., id. at 681.  The Willis court stated: 
However, we, like our sister circuits which have confronted the issue, must also recognize 
that Congress enacted the ADA fully aware of the “well established precedent” under the 
Rehabilitation Act which refused to require employers to violate a [collective bargaining 
agreement’s] bona fide seniority system, and yet failed to include any provision to the 
counter that precedent in the plain language of the ADA. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 192. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000). 
 193. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 9 (1989) (submitted by the Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources) (“Individuals with disabilities experience staggering levels of unemployment and 
poverty.”). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 17 (“President Bush has stated: ‘On the cost side, the national Counsel on the 
Handicapped states that current spending on disability benefits and programs exceeds $60 billion 
annually.’”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 43 (1990) (submitted by the House Committee on 
Education and Labor) (finding “that discrimination results in dependency on social welfare 
programs that cost taxpayers unnecessary billions of dollars each year”). 
 197. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 31 (1989). 
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under sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”198  This 
flexible approach was also endorsed by the House Committee on the 
Judiciary,199 and is a well-recognized guide to making determinations of 
whether a particular accommodation poses an undue hardship.200  This 
approach is consistent with the concepts of reasonable accommodation and 
undue hardship as espoused throughout the ADA’s legislative history. 
Reasonable accommodation “incorporates a range of actions that may be 
necessary to allow a person with a disability to perform the essential functions 
of a job,”201 and is a key requirement of the ADA.202  The House Committee 
on Education and Labor envisioned a process that starts with identification of 
possible accommodations through discussion with the disabled employee and 
any other information source.203  After possible accommodations are identified, 
then the accommodation should be “assess[ed] . . . [for] effectiveness and 
equal opportunity.”204  The accommodation must be effective for the employee 
and be considered for reliability and how timely it may be implemented.205  
The Committee went on to indicate its support for the proposition “that a 
reasonable accommodation should provide a meaningful equal employment 
opportunity,” meaning that it would give disabled employees an opportunity to 
reach a level of performance comparable to that of a non-disabled employee.206  
If two or more effective reasonable accommodations are available, the 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 41 (1990).  The Committee felt that a listing of factors 
to be considered in reasonable accommodation determinations as to undue hardship was more 
appropriate than a proposal which would have set an arbitrary ceiling on cost of accommodation 
compared to salary of the employee.  Id.  The rejected proposal called for a fixed limit of over ten 
percent of the disabled employee’s salary as per se undue hardship.  Id. 
 200. See 1 CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 
104.030 (William A. Hancock ed., 1999) [hereinafter CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE].  See also 
2 BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES § 
22:20 (1992); AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: LAW, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE § 3.9 (Robert A. Maroldo ed., 1992). 
 201. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 34 (1990). 
 202. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 33 (1990); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990) 
(“This reasonable accommodation requirement is central to the non-discrimination mandate of the 
ADA.”); 135 CONG. REC. S4993 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (remarks of Senator Kennedy stating 
“[t]he removal of physical barriers and access to reasonable accommodations are among the most 
essential elements of this measure”). 
 203. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 66 (1990) (“[T]he search for possible accommodations 
must begin with consulting the individual with a disability.  Other resources to consult include the 
appropriate State Vocational Rehabilitation Services agency, the Job Accommodations Network 
operated by the President’s Committee on Employment of People With Disabilities, or other 
employers.”). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
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employer is permitted to choose the least costly or more easily implemented 
one as long as the accommodation does, indeed, provide a meaningful equal 
employment opportunity to the disabled employee.207  Still remaining is the 
requirement that the accommodation not impose an undue hardship. 
Throughout the drafting of the ADA, undue hardship was defined in 
flexible terms, with no specific conditions.  The concept of undue hardship has 
been stated as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense i.e., an 
action that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that will 
fundamentally alter the nature of the program.”208  The term “undue hardship” 
was included for two reasons.209  First, it was intended to distinguish it from 
the definition of “readily achievable” under Title III regarding the requirement 
of alteration of public buildings to allow access to disabled people.210  Second, 
the undue hardship burden “creates a more substantial obligation on the 
employer.”211  The term undue hardship requires a significant obligation on the 
employer’s part, rather than simply an insignificant or de minimis 
obligation.212 
Some courts have placed too much reliance on the precedent under the 
Rehabilitation Act that concluded seniority systems were not to be violated.  
However, the ADA’s legislative history specifically includes modifying 
policies and contains language indicating a seniority system is but one factor in 
an undue hardship determination.213  In order to encourage employment among 
a minority of Americans who faced serious unemployment and dependency, 
Congress enacted the ADA, which requires reasonable accommodation to the 
known limitations of disabled employees.214  Congress intended the process of 
finding a reasonable accommodation to be flexible in order to meet the 
requirements of the employee, while not imposing an undue hardship on the 
employer.  Congress recognized that every employer is different, and, 
therefore, envisioned a case-by-case approach to determining whether an 
accommodation poses such an undue hardship. 
 
 207. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1990). 
 208. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 35 (1989). 
 209. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1990). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32 (1989).  The 
House Report stated: 
[I]f a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given 
amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a 
reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to 
the job.  However, the agreement would not be determinative on the issue. 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63. 
 214. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2000). 
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In fact, Congress considered the risk to employers of not having clearly 
defined standards on which to base their decisions and responded by creating a 
progressive system under the ADA to identify reasonable accommodations.  
The employer must first determine whether an accommodation exists that 
would enable an employee to perform the essential functions of that 
employee’s current position.215  Therefore, if an accommodation may be found 
in an employee’s current position, the risk that other employees’ seniority 
rights will be infringed is reduced.216  If an accommodation may not be found 
in the employee’s current position, then the employer must look to other 
possible accommodations, one of which could require variation of the seniority 
policy.217  However, if more than one effective reasonable accommodation can 
be identified, the employer may choose between the two.218  This allows an 
employer to avoid variation of the seniority policy if another effective 
accommodation exists.  An employer is also not required to implement an 
accommodation that imposes an undue hardship on the employer; thus, if 
varying the seniority system would result in undue hardship, the employer may 
avoid such a variation.219  Despite possible uncertainty in results, which could 
lead to increased litigation costs, an employer has other protections for this 
problem, as will be later discussed.  Reading the ADA in such a way to allow 
variation of a seniority policy not only promotes the basic purpose of the 
legislation, but it also affords protections for employers such that a variance of 
a seniority policy likely not impose an undue burden upon them. 
D. Other Employees’ Rights 
Some courts have suggested that seniority systems may be so “well 
entrenched,” whether contained within a collective bargaining agreement or 
not, that other, more senior employees have a legitimate expectation to a job.220  
Where this is so, requiring an employer to disrupt and violate these legitimate 
expectations would “constitute a fundamental and unreasonable alteration in 
the nature of the employer’s business.”221  As the legislative history also 
indicates, Congress desired to have other employees’ expectations under a 
seniority provision to be a factor in the undue hardship analysis.222 
 
 215. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: LAW, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE 
GUIDANCE, supra note 200, at  § 3.10(5). 
 216. This risk is not completely eliminated due to many seniority clauses allowing employees 
with higher seniority to “bump” lower ranking employees. 
 217. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: LAW, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE 
GUIDANCE, supra note 200, at  § 3.10(5). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 221. Id. 
 222. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990).  This Report stated: 
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An employer may prove hardship based on the effects on coworkers of a 
variation in a seniority policy, but it is uncertain what types of impact on 
coworkers would be considered as undue hardship.223  One court suggested 
that “[w]hat would be lost to the other employees, particularly more senior 
employees, would be some of the value of their seniority within the company, 
not their employment.”224 Under an undue hardship analysis, as the 
discriminatory effect on other employees increases, the more likely it is that a 
court will find the accommodation imposes an undue hardship and is, 
therefore, not required.  Thus, balancing the need for an accommodation 
against the undue hardship it could impose will protect the other employees’ 
legitimate rights, while protecting the rights of disabled employees under the 
ADA at the same time.225 
Some courts and commentators have distinguished seniority provisions 
contained in collective bargaining agreements from those not contained within 
a collective bargaining agreement.  The distinction is one of degree.  Under a 
collective bargaining agreement, the seniority rights are part of an explicit 
employment contract, whereas, without a collective bargaining agreement, the 
seniority rights of employees give rise to expectations under an employer’s 
policy.  Under a balancing test of undue hardship, this would result in a greater 
likelihood that collectively bargained seniority rights would carry more weight 
than seniority policies imposed by the employer, but not contained within a 
collective bargaining agreement.  In this way, both the rights of disabled 
employees and the rights of non-disabled employees may be considered and 
balanced in order to maximize the result for all involved.  An even better 
resolution of this issue would be for the employer to condition application of 
the seniority system on any conflicting ADA requirements.  This would then 
reduce the expectancy interests of the non-disabled employees. 
E. Public Policy 
Two main policy arguments must be considered.  First, opponents of a 
balancing test argue that it is unfair to subject employers to litigation costs 
under either the NLRA or ADA based on the decision they make.  This 
problem would occur where an employer makes a reasonable accommodation 
in violation of a seniority policy and the displaced employee brings a claim 
under the NLRA resulting from the employer’s violation of the collective 
 
[I]f a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given 
amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a 
reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to 
the job.  However, that agreement would not be determinative on the issue. 
Id. 
 223. See Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1468 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 224. Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 225. See Daly-Rooney, supra note 134, at 398. 
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bargaining agreement.  However, if the employer refuses to make such 
reasonable accommodation in violation of the seniority policy, the disabled 
employee could bring a claim under the ADA.  In this way, the employer could 
face litigation no matter which choice it makes.  Second, proponents of the 
balancing test argue against the ability of employers to avoid the duties 
imposed by the ADA by either negotiating employment policies with the union 
or unilaterally imposing employment policies, if there is no union, that allow 
the employer to rule out a possible accommodation in violation of that policy 
as imposing an undue hardship.  Both policy issues will be discussed below. 
One governmental study, admitted into the record of the hearing before the 
Committee on Small Business in the House of Representatives, determined that 
among reasonable accommodations provided by federal contractors, the lowest 
costing accommodations included “changing hours, work procedures, and task 
assignments; transferring the workers to a new job; and orienting 
coworkers.”226  While this study is isolated and outdated, its underlying 
principle remains true: assuming it has been determined that a reasonable 
accommodation does not impose an undue hardship, any financial cost to an 
employer would be minimal. 
The main cost argued by employers is litigation costs generated from both 
uncertainty in determining when a seniority system should be violated, and 
suits, possibly under the NLRA, brought by those employees who had their 
seniority rights violated.227  In effect, this argument makes two claims: (1) that 
an employer could be found in violation of both the ADA and NLRA, and, 
thus, subject to claims brought under both acts and (2) that litigation of such 
claims under the ADA or NLRA will be costly.228  This argument is 
unpersuasive for two reasons.  First, the enforcement agencies of the ADA and 
the NLRA have established a “Memorandum of Understanding” to effectively 
deal with the situation where a conflict arises between the acts.229  Second, 
even in the face of costly litigation, violation of seniority rights will only occur 
in limited circumstances. To require violation of a seniority system, the 
 
 226. Americans With Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Bus., 101st 
Cong. 19 app. IV (1990), reprinted in 5 DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 PUBLIC LAW 101-
336, at doc. 23 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr., et al. eds., 1992) (citing BERKLEY PLANNING 
ASSOCIATES, A STUDY OF ACCOMMODATIONS PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES BY 
FEDERAL CONTRACTORS (June 17, 1982)).  The study surveyed two thousand federal contractors 
covered by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, with 367 responding.  Id.  This study was sponsored 
by the Employment Standards Administration, Department of Labor.  Id. 
 227. See Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 681-82 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
 228. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission oversees enforcement of the ADA and 
the National Labor Relations Board oversees enforcement of the NLRA. 
 229. Memorandum of Understanding Between the General Counsel of the National Labor 
Relations Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Nov. 16, 1993), available 
at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/eeoc-nlrb-ada.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). 
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accommodation in the employee’s current position would, first, have to be 
unavailable or impose undue hardship.230  Second, there would have to be no 
other accommodations that are better or more convenient for the employer 
without imposing undue hardship.231  Lastly, a violation of seniority rights 
would not be required if it posed an undue hardship.  Factoring these 
considerations with the relatively low number of disabled employees any given 
employer employs would lead to very limited circumstances in which a 
variance to the seniority system would be required.  The larger the employer is 
the greater the risk it has, but also the employer is more able to absorb the 
costs.232  It makes sense to subject some employers to risk in a few limited 
circumstances to both further the ADA’s underlying theme of keeping disabled 
Americans at work so they may lead more economically independent lives, and 
for the greater good of opening “once-closed doors into a bright new era of 
equality, independence and freedom.”233 
Beyond the cost issue, another issue arises.  An employer could avoid 
obligations of reasonable accommodation required by the ADA in two 
situations.  Outside of a collective bargaining context, an employer could 
unilaterally create employment policies that prohibit changes in employment 
procedures, such as seniority policies.  Where a union represents the 
employees, the union could enter a collective bargaining agreement that 
prohibits changes in other employment procedures, the issue takes a slightly 
different form, and this variation will be discussed under subsection F, infra. 
F. Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Two general issues arise when the seniority clause is contained in a 
collective bargaining agreement.  The first being involvement of a union and 
the NLRA.  The other issue that arises is better classified as a public policy 
issue.  If a per se bar were established to provisions such as seniority policies, 
an employer could conveniently use a collective bargaining agreement to 
reduce the company’s obligations to provide reasonable accommodations 
under the ADA.  In fact, not allowing otherwise reasonable accommodations to 
Americans with disabilities would not only be required by the agreement—it 
would be mandated by law. 
One of the arguments relied upon by courts in applying a per se bar to 
accommodations requiring an employer to violate a seniority policy is that 
under a balancing approach, an employer may be required to choose whether to 
 
 230. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: LAW, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE, supra note 200, at  § 3.10(5). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 10 (1989). 
 233. Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, BOOK II PUB. PAPERS 
1068 (July 26, 1990). 
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violate the NLRA or the ADA.234  This argument fails to recognize a union’s 
obligations under the ADA.  Unions are obliged in two ways.  First, employers 
may not enter contractual relationships, including ones with labor unions, that 
subject their employees to discrimination.235  Secondly, unions are specifically 
included in the ADA’s definition of “covered entity,”236 so unions must 
conform to the duties required under the ADA, including reasonable 
accommodation.237 
Thus, an employer cannot do contractually what it could not do under the 
ADA.238  This requirement applies whether or not the employer or union 
intended for the relationship to have a discriminatory effect.239  Therefore, an 
employer or union may not, through contract, avoid a duty to make a 
reasonable accommodation.240  However, under a balancing approach, 
employers and unions could still protect their interests while maintaining 
compliance with the ADA.  Since the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement, such as a seniority policy, are in the undue hardship analysis, if an 
employer could show that varying a seniority policy would be unduly 
disruptive to its employees or to the functioning of the business, the 
accommodation would not be required.241 
The EEOC took the position that the union’s duty of reasonable 
accommodation is to negotiate with the employer for a variance in the 
collective bargaining agreement.242  However, this joint obligation of the union 
and the employer is not required if such variance would impose an undue 
hardship.  This process is consistent with both the ADA and the NLRA.  As the 
exclusive bargaining representative, a union may negotiate variations in the 
collective bargaining agreement with an employer without violating the 
 
 234. See, e.g., Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 236 F.3d 675, 681-82 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“We 
are persuaded that it would be improper to subject an employer to the Hobson’s choice of 
violating the ADA or the NLRA, or at least subjecting itself to the threat of litigation under these 
statutes, depending on the outcome of a ‘balancing’ approach.”). 
 235. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 (2001). 
 236. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2000). 
 237. 4 CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE, supra note 200, at 605.102 (reprinting a NLRB 
opinion letter regarding a union’s right to obtain certain medical information for purposes of 
collective bargaining). 
 238. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 app. (2001).  The appendix consists of interpretive guidance issued 
by the EEOC. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 59-60 (1990). 
 241. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 app. (“[A]n employer cannot avoid its responsibility to make 
reasonable accommodation subject to the undue hardship limitation through a contractual 
arrangement.”). 
 242. 4 CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE, supra note 200, at 605.102.  This requirement, of 
course, arises only where there is no other reasonable accommodation and the accommodation 
would not pose an undue hardship, or unduly burden other employees. 
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NLRA.243  Thus, the requirements under both the ADA and the NLRA may be 
met.  Most commentators reached the conclusion, before the courts took up 
this issue, that “[e]xcluding seniority systems would have made the goals of 
the ADA illusory.”244 
G. Appropriateness for Court Action Versus Legislative Action 
As previously noted, most courts that have ruled on the issue of whether 
the ADA may require variation of a seniority policy as a reasonable 
accommodation have relied on prior persuasive precedent without any analysis 
of the issues.245  The courts that have conducted a full analysis have either 
relied on the misguided notion that a position is not vacant if no current 
employee holds it, but a more senior employee is bidding for the job, or have 
misapprehended the plain language and legislative history of the ADA.  Since 
the per se rule against variation of seniority policies has resulted from a 
judicial misapplication and misapprehension of the ADA, it is most appropriate 
for the court, rather than the legislature, to remedy it.  This is true despite 
Judge Trott’s assertion, in his dissent to the majority’s decision in Barnett, that 
this is a policy question for the legislature to resolve.246  However, now that the 
Supreme Court has issued its ruling, which comes very close to a per se bar, it 
will be up to the legislature to remedy this situation. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Rather than applying a per se bar to reassignments that require variation of 
a seniority policy, courts should consider the hardship it creates upon the 
employee(s) affected as a factor in the undue hardship analysis.  Some of the 
factors to consider in this analysis would include: (1) the actual effect on non-
disabled employees resulting from the variation from the seniority policy; (2) 
the frequency of and reasons for prior deviations from the seniority policy; and 
 
 243. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000) (specifying a particular process 
that must be followed in order to seek a modification of a collective bargaining agreement). 
 244. See Daly-Rooney, supra note 134, at 401.  Cf. Ervin, supra note 139, at 926-97 (“The 
duty of a covered entity under the ADA to make reasonable accommodation is different from the 
duty imposed by the Rehabilitation Act and should be capable of mitigation by the provisions of a 
collective bargaining agreements only under extraordinary circumstances.”); Stahlhut, supra note 
122, at 92 (“Equity concerns also dictate that collectively bargained rights should not 
automatically trump a disabled employee’s request for accommodation.”); DuBault, supra note 
122, at 1292 (“To conclude that the ADA shuns per se determinations and requires a genuine ad 
hoc balancing of ADA and NLRA rights and obligations is only the beginning.  The more 
difficult question is what factors must be considered when balancing those rights and obligations 
and why.”). 
 245. See supra Part III.A. 
 246. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1125 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Trott, J., 
dissenting) (“What to do with seniority systems in this context is a policy question for Congress, 
one which we as judges have no authority or ability to resolve.”). 
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(3) whether the seniority policy is contained in a collective bargaining 
agreement or is an employer-imposed seniority system. 
The actual effect of a variation of a seniority policy upon non-disabled 
employees will vary greatly depending on the type of action required.  Under 
the ADA, it is clear that bumping of employees is not required,247 so if a senior 
employee holds a position and the disabled employee seeks that position, the 
accommodation will impose an undue hardship.  However, if a disabled 
employee seeks reassignment to an otherwise vacant position that another 
more senior employee is bidding for, it is more likely that granting the less 
senior disabled employee the position will not impose an undue hardship.  This 
would be especially true in circumstances in which a disabled employee is 
seeking reassignment to a vacant position of which no more senior employee is 
bidding for, even if the position requires a certain amount of seniority which 
the disabled employee has not yet attained.  Since no rights of other employees 
would be affected, the employer would be required to show that the requisite 
seniority requirement is a business necessity.  Accommodations should, 
therefore, be assessed for actual effect on employees, and this effect should 
then be considered as a factor in the undue hardship determination. 
Courts should also consider the frequency of and reasons for prior 
deviations from the seniority policy as factors in the undue hardship analysis.  
If an employer has previously assented, either unilaterally or with the consent 
of the union, to a variation in the seniority policy, the other employees’ 
expectations arising from the seniority policy would decrease.  Thus, the 
greater number of variations in the past will decrease the hardship falling on 
other employees.  Also, the lower importance or lower necessity of prior 
deviations would decrease the expectations of other employees and the 
hardship they may face.  For example, if an employer had an open position 
which required a certain amount of seniority, and the employer granted an 
exception to the policy in order to fill the position from within the company, it 
would be more likely that allowing a similar exemption to the policy for a 
disabled employee would result in less of a hardship on the employer and other 
employees. 
Whether the seniority policy is contained within a collective bargaining 
agreement or is unilaterally imposed by an employer will also bear on the 
decision.  Where a collective bargaining agreement is involved, there may be a 
slightly greater expectation from the employees that the policy will be adhered 
to, thus, resulting in a greater burden of hardship on the employees.  However, 
unions are also a “covered entity” within the meaning of the ADA, and they 
should have a burden to establish reasonable accommodations for disabled 
employees.  Even in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, 
employees have reasonable expectations of employer adherence to the 
 
 247. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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seniority policy.  Employers should also remember that they should not be 
allowed to do through contract what they could not otherwise do.  Creating 
seniority policies would be an easy way for employers to avoid obligations 
under the ADA, and with the widespread use and importance of such policies, 
it would be much easier for the employer to mask any attempt to avoid the duty 
to reassign under the ADA.  If employers are able to avoid obligations in this 
way, employment policies will be put in place with minimal justification, and 
the obligations imposed by the ADA to reasonably accommodate disabled 
employees will be negated by the employment policies adopted. 
In addition, the progressive system implemented by Congress to determine 
whether a variance of a seniority policy is required helps protect the employer 
from an unreasonable amount of litigation over its decision.  Because of this 
system, in many circumstances the employer will not even have to consider a 
reassignment that is contrary to a seniority policy because either another 
reasonable accommodation within the disabled employee’s current position or 
another accommodation, consistent with the employment policies already in 
place, is available.  Therefore, only if a reasonable accommodation within an 
employee’s current position is not possible and other reasonable 
accommodations consistent with employment policies impose an undue 
hardship should variation of seniority policies be considered. 
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